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ABSTRACT 
Congl'essional mkromanagement of the defense budget is a crucial element of the 
struggle between the legislative and executive branches to shape military spending, By 
altering presidential fUnding requests. Congress can impose its own preferences on the 
defense budget. and thereby help guide the restructuring of U.S. armed forces. 
Congressional micromanagement has drawn enormous criticism from academics and 
Department of Defense official. Yet. for all its criticism, surprisingly little empirical 
research has been conducted on the number and magnitude of program funding changes 
appropriated by Congress 
This thesis use.~ budgeting dllcumenl~ provided by the Comptroller of the 
Depattment of Defense to conduct two related studies, The first is a multi year (Fiscal 
Years 1989-19(4) trend analysis of one account. procurement. which examines how the 
end of the Cold-War has affected micromanagement by congressional appropriators. The 
second study examines all defense budget categories for one representative year (FY 1(94) 
to compare the amount of micromanagement in procurement with that of other accounts, 
Taken together, these studies answer four questions crucial to the lssue of 
mkmmanagement. (I) what percentage of procurement funding requests are altered in 
congressional appropJiutions. and how has that percentage changed with the collapse of 
the Soviet threat; (2) how big are the cut~ -- and additions -- made by the appropriators 
to the president's request: (3) whether the House or the Senate is more dominant in 
shaping the final appropriations bill; and (4) which of the armed servi<.:es and element~ 
of the defense budget are subjected to the greatest micromanagement? 
111is thesis argues that despite the end of the Cold War. the percentage of budget 
line items for procurement (i.e. weapons production) altered by congreSSional 
appropriators remained nearly constant from FY 1989-1994. In the six year analyzed, the 
percentage of procurement line items <.:hanged by congreSSional appropriators was 
between 20 to 23 per<.:ent. Measured in dollars. Congress never <.:hanged more than 27 
percent of the total spending in the president'S tinding request. Congress subtracted from 
more line items that it added to, however line item subtra<.:tions were smaller \on average 
(42 million dollars) than additions (63 million dollars). This thesis also found that Senate 
changes to individual line items were more likely to be retained in the final appropriations 
bill than were House <.:hanges. However, when averaged, line item changes proposed by 
the House were <.:loser to the final <.:onference avemge than those proposed in the Senate 
A <.:ross service analysis of defense appropriations line item budgeting revealed no 
parti<.:ular servi<.:e as the prime target of Congressional micromanagement, nor were any 
specific pro<.:urement programs within the services targeted above other programs. Finally, 
the single year <.:fOSS sectional analysis revealed that the activity in the DoD procurement 
account is indicative of legislative change in the operations and research accnunt~_ but not 
in construction and housing. 
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EXF,CUTIVE SUMMARY 
CongressIOnal micromanagement ofthe defense budget IS a crucial element of the struggle 
between the legislative and executive branches to shape milital)' spending. By altering 
presidential funding requests, Congress can impose Its own preferences on the defense budget 
and, thereby, help guuje the restructuring of U.S armed forces Congressional micromanagement 
has drawn enormous criticism from academics and defense department offiCIals Yet, for aJl Its 
cfltielsm, surpflslllgly IHtie empuieal research has been conducted on the number and magllltude 
of program fundlllg changes appropnated by Congress 
ThIS theSIS uses budgetlllg documents provided by the Comptroller of the Department of 
Defense to conduct two related studIes. The first IS a multi year (FYs 1989-1994) trend analysis 
of one account, procurement, willch examines how the end of the Cold-War has affected 
micromanagement by congressIOnal appropriators The second study exammes all defense budget 
categones for one representative year (FY 1994) to compare the amount of mICfOmanagement 
in procurement with that of other accounts. Taken together, these studies answer four quesllons 
crUCIal to the Issue of mlcromanagement, (I) what percentage of procurement funding requests 
arc altered m congressional appropriations, and how has that percentage changed wJlh the 
collapse of the SovIet threat, (2) how big are the cuts - and additions - made by the appropriators 
to the president's request; (3) whICh chamber, the House or the Senate, is more dommant in 
shaplIlg the final appropnations bIlL and (4) which of the armed servIces or program elements 
wilhlll the defense budget are subjected to the greatest mlcromanagement" 
This thesIs argues that despite the end of the Cold War, the percentage of budget line 
items for procurement (i.e. weapons production) altered by congressIOnal appropriators remained 
nearly constant from FY 1989 to FY 1994. In the SIX year analyzed, the percentage of 
procurement line-items changed by congressional appropnators was between 20 to 23 percent 
Measured In dollars, Congress never changed more than 27 percent of the total spending in the 
president's funding request. Congress subtracted from more line items that it added to, however 
line item subtractions were smaller on average (42 million dollars) than additions (63 million 
dollars). This thesis abo found that Senate changes to individual line items were more likely to 
be retained in the final appropriations bill than were House changes. However, when averaged, 
line Item changes proposed by the House were closer to the final conference average Ihan those 
proposed in the Senate 
A cross service analysis of defense appropriatIOns hne item budgeting revealed no 
panicular service as the prime target of Congressional micromanagcmenl, nor were any specific 
procurement programs within the services targeted above athel programs flllally, the single year 
cross sectional analysis revealed that the activity in the DoD procurement account IS indicative 
of legislative change in the operations and research accounts, but not in construction and housing 
Additionally, there is very little coheSion between the various defense oversight committees other 
than the fact that appropriators do tend to stay Within the limits set by the authorization bill 
Appropnalors are also much more active overall and tend to cut from budget requests more 
frequently than authorizers 

I. INTRODllcnON 
CongressIOnal micromanagement of the defense bud13el IS a crucIal element of the 
struggk between the legIslatIve and executIve branches to shape ml!Jtar.,.. spending_ By 
altenng the specifIc program funding requests made by the president, Congress can 
Impose its ovm detailed preferences Oil the defense budget and, thereby, help gUide the 
restructunng of US armed furces fur the post-Cold War era. This congressional 
ffilCromanagemcnt has dra\Ml enormous critiCism from academic~ and defense department 
officIals, who attack It as an mappropnate legislative power grab that dJ~rupts and distorts 
the military's budgeting process Yet for all this cnllcism, surprisingly little emplfJcal 
research has been conducted on the actual number and magnitude of program funding 
challge~ made by Congress This lack of research IS particularly true of the funding 
ultimately appropnuteu (and not merely authorizt:ld) for defense_ Mort:lover, whde many 
academiCS argue that congressIOnal micro management IS dnven by the desire to create 
weapons production jobs for constituents, no study has focused on mlcromanagement of 
the procurement (I eo, weapons productIOn) account by comparing the amount of 
micf()management In that account With othel defense budgt:lt categories_ Nor have 
previous studies examined vanatlOns in the amount of micromanagement directed at the 
appropnatJons for the Army, AIr Force, Navy and Manne Corps 
This thesis uses budgetmg documents provided by the Comptroller of the 
Department of Defense to conduct twO related studies The first IS a multi-year 
(fYs 1989-1994) trend analYSIS of one account, procurement, which exammes how the 
end of the Cold War has affected ffilcromanagement by congreSSIOnal appropnators. The 
second study examllles all defense budget categones for one representative year 
(fY 1994) to compare the amount of micro management III procurement with that of other 
accounts_ Taken together, thest: studies answer four quesllons crUCial to the Issue of 
micromanagement- (1) what percentage of procurement fundlllg requests are altered III 
congressional appropriations and how has that percentage changed with the collap~e of 
the Soviet threat; (2) how big are the cuts - and addlllolls - made by appropriators to the 
president's request; (3) which chamber, the House or the Senate, IS more dominalll III 
~haping the final appropriations bi!!; and (4) which of the armed ~ervjces or program 
clements within the defense budget are subjected to the greatest micromanagement'! 
ThiS thesis argues that despl1e the end of the Cold War, the percentage of budget 
hne-items for procurement altered by congreSSional appropriators has remained nearly 
constant from FY 1989 to FY 1994 In the SIX years analyzed, the percentage of 
procuremelll line-items changed by congreSSIOnal appropnators showed little vanallon, 
ranglllg from between 20 to 23 percent over that period If the change relationships 
between procurement and two other accounts, operations and research, observed during 
the cross sectional analysis of the FY 1994 are indicative of standard patterns, than very 
few of the budget changes made by legislators over the last SIX years are atYPical 
Measured in dollars, Congress never changed more than 27 percent of the total spending 
in the president's procurement request The highs were achieved III lOY 1<}90 and 1991 
when congressIOnal dissatisfaction with the president's request was especially intense. Of 
the line-item changes made, appropriators cut program reque"ts more often than they 
increased funding_ However, line-item subtractions were smaller III size ($42 million on 
average) than were additions ($63 million on average)_ This study also finds that in four 
of the six years sampled, mdlvidual Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee 
hne-item changes were more likely to be retained in the final bill than were House 
Appropriations changes. However, the House more often was closer to the procurement 
account's net dollar value average (in both addlttons and subtractions). Taken together 
these findmgs mdlcate that the fmal conference accept~, at face value. more Senate marks 
but on the whole strives to stay closer to House marks_ Addllionally. a cross-cut analysis 
of annual defense appropriations line-item budgeting reveals that no particular service or 
program element was the target of the Congressional mlcronlanagemenL Nor was any 
particular servlcc or program singled out during FY I <}94's cross-sectIOnal study_ Congress 
changes roughly 21 % of the line-items submitted each year in the president's procurement 
budget request, procurement equates to about 33% of the whole 000 budget The net 
fiscal effects of the changes are small, only about $1,8 billion dollars decrease in a $280 
billion dollar budget in $1994 
IL mE ISSUE OF MICROMANAGEMENT 
When critics attack Congress for micromanaging defense, that charge usually includes 
a multitude of sins: requiring the Department of Defense to submit numerous (and 
nonsensical) reports, demanding too much testimony from DoD witnesses at legislative 
hearings, or a variety of other congressional dictates. However, the element of 
micromanagement that is most significant for defense budgeting is the congressional 
penchant for altering "line-items" in the president's budget request; that is, for making 
specifiC changes to the funding proposals of individual programs listed in the request. The 
growth of this form of micromanag;ment emerged in part due to the larger, post-Viemam 
and post-Watergate effort by Congress to playa greater role in military policymaking. 
However, micromanagement also reflected the competition for budgetary influence 
between the authorizing committees and the appropriations committees (especially the 
House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees). In 1960 the Armed Services 
Committees began to apply the technique of annual authorizations to the procurement part 
of the defense budget and then continued to expand its application to other titles within 
the budget. (Kolodziej 1966, Stephens 1971, Art 1985a). Robert J. Art argues that 
Intercommittee rivalry (between the Anned Services and Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittees) and control over the Pentagon were the two political imperatives 
that drove the Armed Services Committee into ever more detailed reviews of the 
annual budget and away from what had been their pattern from 1945-1960, namely, 
a rather general look at the nation's defense policies through annual posture 
hearings. (Art, 1985a, 229) 
Concurrent with Art's article, an extensive "tudy of defense decision making procedures 
by the Senate Armed Services Committee (Including three days of testimony on the 
Senate Floor by Senators Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) and Sam Nunn (D-GA» heightened 
attention to the problem of mlcromanagement. Several articles later appeared castigating 
the fallure of Congress to provide reasoned overSight and recommendmg extensive 
structural changes (Crackel 1985, Higg~ 19S~, Art 1989, Owens \(91) A 1990 Defense 
Department White Paper epitomll.ed the compiling of statistical facb attacking 
CongressJOnalmtiusion into defense policy plannmg The common theme of these studies 
IS that 'good oversight' reqUires constant vigilance of leglslallve goals and action pnmanly 
through strategic dialogue, and that congressional mlcromanagement of program spendmg 
IS disruptive to coherent budgetmg 
However, whde normatlve critiCism of mlcromanagement abound~> far less empirical 
work has been done to measure the actual amount of micromanagement Only two studies 
and a handful of short articles in the Armed Porees Journal International actually carry 
out a detailed emplflcal study of Congressional micro management The first study was 
an unpublished report by Robert Bledsoe that documented the combined number of 
hne-item changes by the Armed Services and Defense Appropnation~ Subcommittees for 
fiscal years J'I76-1983. The findings of the ~tudy indicate that Congress changed over 
10,000 Ime-Hems withlll the defense bmlgd dunng the eight years cun~ldcred (Art, 
J 985a, 234) The basiS of what constitutes a Ime-item IS crUCial for evaluatlllg the efficacy 
of Bledsoe's work, but hIS study remains unpubhshed and is not available, Line-Item 
definition is particularly true of changes to the construction portion of the budget request 
This portion of the budget is composed of many small program sub-elements that must 
be individually reviewed, authorized, and appropriated in order for the defense comptroller 
to allocate funding. However both the construction budget and changes to it are 
inSignificant in comparison to the bulk of the president's request. While commenting 
about the expansion in the scope of annual authorizations during the same period as 
Bledsoe's study, Barry Blechman noted that the one exception was military construction 
(In the defense construction account) ... "the armed services committees insisted on 
the right to authorize most individual construction projects. Construction, however, 
constituted only a tiny portion of defense spending and did not entail first-order 
decisions on defense policy and military strategy." (Blechman, 1990, 30) 
The increasing scope of Congressional authorizations and appropriations and its effect on 
the increase in the number of line-item changes to the defense request is another problem 
often overlooked by Congressional critics. Every empirically oriented Congressional 
micromanagement study comments on the dramatic increase in the annual number of 
line-items changed (Art 1985 and 1990, Blechman 1990, OSD 1990, Owens 1990, 
Lindsay 1991, Wildavsky 1992). No study links any measure of the increase to the 
broader issue that Congress had dramatically increased the scope of its budgetary review 
during those same years. Aaron Wildavsky. commenting on the descensus of defense, 
wrote that 
In 1969 Congress made 180 changes to the defense authorizations bill and 650 
revisions to the appropriations bill. These numbers increased to 222 and 1032, 
respectively, in 1975 and skyrocketed by 1985 to 1145 authorization adjustments 
and 2156 appropriations adjustments. (Wildavsky, 1992,404) 
A portion of the Increases in linc-Item mlcrumanagcmcnt are certainly due to more 
detailed scrutmy of the budget request, but a portIon of the increru;e IS aho due to the 
inclUSIOn of alltypcs of weapons 1/1 1970, Operations and Maullenance Programs in 1982, 
and all Procurement Programs ill 1983 The breadth of Programs Wider Cungressional 
scrutlllY is a thfferent Issue than the detail of micromanagement 
Moreover, knowledge of the basis and dispersion of line-item changes IS crucial 
because much of the empirical work that has been done IS methodologically flawed 
Typical JJ1 this regard is the Initial Armed Forces Journal International study done by 
Deborah Kyle. She argued that Congress changed over 60% of the IllIe-ltems accounted 
for in the 1984 defense budget request. Specifically, Kyle wrote that, 
the Senate AppropnatlOns Committee 
reviewed and the House Approprjation~ changed a whopping 
68% .. although proportionally SImilar, Committee changes were redundant only half 
of the tlllle In most cases one Committee changed one Ime-Item, while the other 
adjusted a different one, thereby reworking nearly every line-Item In the budget 
(Kyle, 1984,24) 
However, Kyle's study was methodologically flawed Kyle used only the Department of 
Defense final line-item summary on CongressIOnal aetion lmore commonly called the 
FinanCial Accounting Document or "FAD") in delermining the base number of Ime-items 
Within the preSident's budget request. Th!.,; document excluslvely addresses the specdlc 
program clement funding requests that were subject to change by Congress. The FAD 
ll1c1udc~ only those items that Congress has conSIdered for change, not the total number 
of line-items 111 the preSIdent's defense budget request That request includes thousands 
of lme-items that arc suffiCIently non-controversial to Congress that they are exduded 
from the FAD. In order to Identify the total number of line-Items in the president's 
request. a diff(lfent set of documents must be used. The DoD Comptroller provIdes three 
documents to Congress that !dt;lntify all of the line-items In their re~pective budget 
categories' Procurement Programs (the "1'-1"); Research, Testing, Development. and 
Evaluation Programs (the "R-I "J; ('onstruct!on and Housing Programs (the "C-I "), 'I here 
is no such document for Operallons and Maintenance Programs Kyle's failure to use the 
proper sources for determinmg the total number of Ime-items m the presJdcnt's request led 
her to overestimate the percentage of line-Items changed by Congress A later Armed 
Forces Journal Internahonal studJes accounted for all line-Ilems III the budget request 
when calculating the percent changed in the FAD Although thIS study indIcated a hIgher 
number of line-Item changes were made, Its percent changed determinations were much 
lower Specifically, 1579 appropriatlOns line-item changes m FY 1988 amounted \0 only 
32% of the requested hne-Jtems and 80S appropriations changes in FY 1989 adjusted an 
even lower 21% of the next year's request (Dean, 1989, 14) The last good t;lmpirical 
study of line-item \.:hanges wa5 completed by James Lindsay in 1990, This was a very 
limited accountmg of changes to hne-Hems of nuclear weapons related e'l:penses withill 
the Procurt;lment and Research Programs, Though the study was limited it was a so lind 
accountlOg of changes viewed as a percent of lotallJne-JlemS and dollar values taken from 
lheP-1 andR-l 
A second problem with much of the empincal literature on micromanagement is that 
It emphasizes authOflL.1tions, as opposed to appropriations, While the authorizatlOns 
process is an integral part of defense budgetlllg, the final process through which funds arc 
appropriated for specific programs ultimately determines the actual spending levels for 
individual line·items. This is due to the fact that the House and Senate Appropriations 
Committees (and particularly their Defense Appropriations Subcommittees) possess the 
authority to actually "write the checks" that fund DoD programs. The appropriation of 
funding customarily occurs after the authorization process. In theory, the appropriators are 
supposed to be guided by the funding levels established by the authonzation committees 
(i.e., the House and Senate Anned Services Committees). In practice, however, the 
appropriators do not always adopt the funding levels in the authorization committee 
conference reports, and numerous line·items within the DoD budgets are funded either 
higher or lower than the level designated in the Defense Authorizations Bill. In effect, the 
appropriations committees create their own separate versions of the Defense Bill, giving 
those committees the final power to shape the DoD budget 
A third empirical problem lies in determining which portions of the DoD budget to 
study. Some budget categones suffer from anomalies that make them poor points of 
reference for measuring micromanagement as a whole. For example, Military Construction 
Programs are considered separately from other budget requests even to the point of being 
authorized and appropriated under a different bill than all other defense accounts. The 
findings of this study also indicate that Construction and Housing programs are adjusted 
differently than are the remainder of the military budget requests. Another anomalous 
category is funding for the Reserve and National Guard. The services have been gradually 
reducing these two components' operations, procurement, and construction budgets. There 
are no reserve or guard procurement funding requests in the FY 1994 or 1995 DoD 
budget submission, Congress generally reacts by adding line·items and increasing funding 
in its authorization and appropriations bills. This reaction would suggest an extensive 
legislative interest in the reserve and guard quite above Congress' actual concerns 
Moreover, given the many thousands of total line·items in the 10tal DoD budget, 
practical considerations dictated that this study's multi·year analysis of micromanagement 
focus on one budget category. We selected defense procurement for a number of reasons. 
While there are many different budget accounts within the DoD budget (Operations and 
Maintenance, Research and Development, etc.), Owens and others have argued that 
Procurement seems especially likely to be micromanaged by Congressional conduct that 
is driven by the desire to create JObs for constituents. (Owens, 1991, 142-3) Weapons 
production offers a particularly tempting target for such "pork"-oriented behavior. 
This thesis attempts to present a more thorough measure of congressional 
micromanagement than currently exists. The statistical analysis is presented in four parts. 
The first analyzes legislative appropriations of the defense budget request 10 evaluate how 
many line-items out of the total were changed and by how much. The second part of the 
analysis considers each annual budget against its service components to identify any 
service specific anomalies in the appropriations process. The third part of the analysis 
compares House and Senate actions to determine the influence each chamber has to effect 
its mark on the fmal bill. Finally, the fourth part of this study is a cross sectional analysis 




Part of the difficulty in examining micromanagement lies in understanding how 
line-items are created in the president's request The line-items within the president's 
request are the result of a complex defense budgetmg process that requires years of 
programmed planning. The defense department budgeting system is a highly intricate 
multi-staged mechanism that begins with each service's budget submission and generates 
a complex defense budget; an enigmatic document composed of over fifteen hundred 
program elements, five thousand line-items, and over one hundred different accounting 
systems. The budget is fanned through a routinized sequence of decisions taken within 
a hierarchy of constraints, standard operating procedures, and Simple decision making 
rules. (Mintz, 1988, 22) The individual service budget submissions are organized by 
program categories (such as strategic forces, general purpose forces, airlift and the like), 
which are collated, reconstructed, and divided into Ime-items by the defense comptroller. 
These divisions designate the object of the expenditure and the effecting service 
Budgetary excesses are then reconciled to a specific ceiling 
It is important to note that the number of defense budget line-items that exist at anyone 
time is constantly fluctuating. The standard document that contains all procurement 
line-items available in print is called the P-l, and it is the closest snapshot representation 
of procurement line-items published for each fiscal year in existence at any time. The 
11 
benchmark count of line-items used in this study came from the P-Is for each respective 
year. The Defense Comptroller's Program and Financial Department tracks all line-items 
considered by the Congressional Authorizations and Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittees. They publish a record of this line-item activity in a document called the 
Financial Accounting Documents (FAD). FADs track line-items that are singled out for 
potential change during either the authorizations or appropriations process. The FAD is 
a comprehensive compilation of all Congressional action and so was used as the basis for 
this study's accounting of changes made by Congress. Line-items listed in the FAD are 
drawn from all parts of the defense budget. However only line-items from the 
procurement accounts (excluding accounts designated for Reserve forces) were used in 
the multi-year analysis conducted in this study. 
Figure I is a representative page from a FAD. The format is standardized. First listed 
(reading from left to right) are the line-item number and noun name. The next column 
specifies the amended presidential budget request The following columns list the House 
and Senate Defense Appropriations Committees floor action. The dollar values in these 
columns represent the additions, subtractions, or agreement to the funding requested in 
the presidential budget. The header in these columns also specifies the House or Senate 
report number. The next column contains the resolution resulting from the Senate and 
House Appropriations Committees Conference. During this meeting the two chambers of 
Congress settle any differences in funding to determine the defense appropriations bill's 
final mark. The amount of spending agreed upon in conference will be the amount signed 
12 
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Figure 1. Representative Page from FAD 
13 
into law. The final column listed on a FAD page lists the amount of spending enacted 
into law for each line-item considered 
The defense department comptroller produces the FAD because it is concerned about 
the effects of Congressional changes. Legislative micromanagement does adversely 
affect the Pentagon's planning and programming process. Many of the projects listed as 
line-items can take years to complete. Reducing such a project's budget for the current 
year results in a reassessment of the out-year budget needs. The revised costs must not 
only account for the lost money but also for increases due to inflation and for production 
inefficiencies introduced by stretching out the program. These fiscal setbacks will, in turn, 
ripple out to affect the funds available for other programs in the out-years. In this way the 
original line-item change can permeate out into future budgets and affect many more 
projects than the single line-item first modified by Congress. Capitol Hill is aware of the 
affect of its micromanagement and of its responsibilities for oversight. The FAD 
documents legislative decisions to review program elements but does not provide 
Congressional rational for those decisions. According to a senior staff member of the 
Senate Appropriations interviewed for this study, specific line-items can be singled out 
for any number of reasons: due to historical interest, because of some specifiC like or 
dislike, or because a member intends to add or subtract from a range of programs 
associa1ed with a line-item. Any line-item considered by the defense authorization or 
appropria1ions committees shows up on the FAD (whether it is ultimately changed or not). 
Parts of the Defense Budget not listed in the FAD are the classified intelligence 
procurement budgets for each of the respective services. While there are classified 
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line-items within the DoD Procurement budget (listed either by their code name or simply 
by the label "classified program") there is no "single-source" document modeled along 
the lines of the FAD tracking funding of intelligence line-items through the appropriations 
process. While it is obvious that such a document would not be available for unclassified 
research, extensive inquiry indicates that such a document simply does not exist at all 
According to a senior Defense Department budget official, the intelligence community has 
been more concerned with the intelligence information traveling through the hardware on 
hand and much less concerned with defending the purchase of the hardware itself. 
In essence, the intelligence community has been more results oriented than hardware 
oriented. This attitude translates into a mission oriented approach to defending intelligence 
procurement programs when testifying to Congress, and has resulted in a lack of line-item 
tracking over time. While this process of budgeting appears to have been successful to 
date, it has resulted in little tangible information available for analysis, and until only 
recently (as result of the shrinking DoD budget) little enthusiasm for tracking line-items 
over time. Since there is no comprehensive list of intelligence procurement line-items 
available for analysis, intelligence procurement budgets for the services will not be 
addressed within the limits of this study. However, in light of the continuous decline in 
defense procurement (and in the Defense Budget as a whole) it would appear wise for the 
intelligence community to take aboard the concept of line-item management and tracking, 
if for no other purpose than to have an additional tool for analysis. 
Each line-item listed in the FADs for 1989-1994, and used in this study, was manually 
entered into a database for analysis. While this process was time consuming, it afforded 
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detailed analysis by sophisticated computer statistical software packages (specifically 
Siaiview by MacIntosh and SPSS). Table I lists the coding format used in the data entry 
for this study. Figure 2 shows an example of how the data from the FAD looked when 
entered into the analysis database. The data first was broken down by service component 
(Army, Navy, Air Force) then by program account (Operations, Procurement, Research) 
and finally by program element (aircraft, weapons, ships). The data was entered by 
line~item withm each program in the order it appeared in the FAD 
TABLE I CODING FORMAT FOR DATA ENTRY 
SERVICE PROGRAM PROCUREMENT 
ARMY I PROCUREMENT I AIRCRAFT I 
NAVY 2 PERSONNEL 2 WEAPONS 3 
AIR FORC 3 OPER& MAINT 3 SHIPS 3 
MARINES 4 RDT&E 4 VEHICLES 4 
DEFENSE 5 MANAGEMENT 5 AMMUNITION 5 
CONSTRUCTION 6 RESERVES 6 
HOUSING 7 OTHER 9 
16 
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A. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTI-YEAR DATA 
The first stage of analysis considered successive annual procurement requests against 
appropriations changes as a whole. This examination measured the percent of procurement 
line-item changes for each year. This was done by counting the number of changes 
documented in each year's FAD and dividing by the total procurement line-items 
documented in the corresponding year's P-L The next level of analysis split the annual 
appropriations changes down into the number of additions and subtractions. These changes 
were evaluated for percentage variations and for their net dollar value changes. Finally 
the monetary data from the preceding analysis was merged to reflect the total dollar 
amount (by summing the absolute value of additions and subtractions) and the net amount 
(by summing the raw value of additions and subtractions). This process was conducted 
successively against the whole budget, against the service and program components, and 
finally against program element breakdowns. The resulting values reflected the total 
change for each year under study. 
The next stage of analysis involved statistical evaluation of the tabulated budget 
accounts to detennine mean levels of activity by legislative committee. This required a 
careful review of coding to exempt line-item changes that were not modified by the 
committee being evaluated (i.e. excluding line-item whose change value was zero). 
The primary purpose of the statistical analysis was to determine whether changes made 
by Congress show a standard normal distribution pattern. This portion of the study 
focused on two distinct levels of analysis; first on the correlation of House, Senate, and 
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Conference activity and second on an analysis of variance (ANOVA) between legislative 
treatments of program elements 
Correlation analysis studies the joint behavior of two statistical populations to see 
whether they are related. The strength of their relationship is measured by a correlation 
coefficient (r) which varies from *1 to I. Correlation analysis does not depend on which 
of the two populations under study is treated as the dependent variable nor on the units 
in which the populations are measured. Correlation is a general measure of the linear 
relationship among the variable where the highest orders of relationship are achieved 
when the correlation coefficient is 1 (positive slope) or *1 (negative slope). Statistical 
rules of thumb provide that the correlation is weak when the coefficient is less than 0.5, 
strong when the coefficient is greater than 0.85, and moderate otherwise. The square of 
the coefficient roughly describes the percentage of the sample that could be accounted for 
by a linear model 
Analysis of variance is a more rigorous study of sample populations that tests for 
differences in true averages associated with different treatments of a controlling factor 
In this study the budget request is the base statistical population and the iegisJative action 
is the factor under study. ANOV A tests against the assumption that the base and treatment 
populations are all normally distributed with the same variance. ANOVA derives a test 
statistic (F) that gauges agreement between the sample population and a theoretical 
standard (a chi-squared distribution). A large difference between the test population's 
F*test and the theoretical F-lest indicates a weak relationship between the factor under 
study and the base population. This difference is normally shown as a p value. This is a 
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test of significance common to all statistical analyses_ The p value cooveys information 
about the strength of the test that allows evaluation at any level of testing, The p value 
varies between I and 0 where a value closer to I indicates test significance and closer to 
o indicates insignificance, Most computer driven statistical analysis packages 
automatically calculate and display p values, A conclusion about significance can then be 
drawn direclly from the output data without reference to tables of critical values (as would 
be required to evaluate the f-test) 
Correlation measurements were taken to investigate the strength of the relationship 
between the Housc, Senate, and Confercnce action for each year, ANOVA measurements 
were taktm by percentages and funding levels to determine pattern of relationships within 
the program and service components 
B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OJ<' SINGLE YEAR CROSS SEC.,,]'10NAL DATA 
The initial analysis of Congressional appropriations action searched for trends within 
multi-year budgetlOg of the defense procurement accounts. The follow on empirical survey 
analyzed all budgetary accounts within a single year to find out if Congressional action 
amending the procurement account typifies action within other defense accounts. This 
portion of the study focused on the 1994 defense budget request and included both the 
House and Senate Armed Service Committees' and Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittees' action on all accounts represented in the FAD, Although the FAD treats 
each program al:count similarly there arc differences in the original budget submission 
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between those accounts. The first and most obvious difference is that the Anned Services 
Committees do not authorize specific sums of money for personnel but rather authorize 
a specific end strength. The end strength can be converted to a dollar figure given certain 
assumptions about cost per man and rank distributions. These calculations are not 
included in the FAD. Appropriations for personnel are provided by single line budgets 
differentiated only by service. These anomalies differentiate the personnel accounts from 
other accounts and make them unsuitable for line-item analysis through statistical 
methods. The Operations and Maintenance account (O&M) is also anomalous in that there 
is no 0-1 and only a limited elemental division of line-items in the president's budget 
request. Legislative committees overcome this by breaking the operations accounts apart 
in their own legislative review. This requires a slightly different treatment of the O&M 
account to allow for a measured appraisal of this process. The base line-item count for 
O&M is taken as the number of line-items in the final bill (as delineated in the FAD) 
The Procurement (P-l), Research (R-l). and Construction (C-I) accounts do have Itemized 
budget requests and these were used to determine the base number of line-items within 
each account. The Construction account can be broken down even further. First into 
Construction and Housing since both accounts are treated separately in the C-l. This was 
done. Second as specific projects within each element line. by law the Office of the 
Comptroller must receive specific authorization and appropriation for each project to 
allocate funding. This study remained at the level of elemental detail to remain consistent 
with the review afforded other budgetary accounts. 
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The statistical methodology utilized two-way contingency tables that compared change 
frequency coded as a nominal variable against action within budget categories by different 
legislative committees_ The purpose for employing a contingency table methodology was 
to investigate whether the proportions between the different budgetary categories are the 
same as for the whole statistical population. The hypothesis is that the sample population 
is categorically homogeneous. The first step in conducting the test is to tabulate the 
observed population values so that they can be compared to the expected population. The 
expected number of observations is the product of the sample population and category 
proportion. If the hypothesis of homogeneity is true and all samples are large (n:> 5), the 
differences between the sample population and the expected population should be small. 
The test results provided observed and expected counts, a chi-squared test value, and its 
associated level of significance (p). 
The statistical results for the multi-year and single year analyses are presented 
graphically through the charts provided in the results chapter. The multi-year analysis 
yielded charts ofpercenl change in total line-items by program and service and composite 
dollar changes by addition, subtraction, average, and net differentiated by program and 
service. These same graphs were prepared for the single year analysis as well as charts 
showing committee differences and levels of association. These later chart displays 
program category along the x-axis and associated counts along the y-axis_ The observed 
counts are shown as the blocks originating from the x-axis, the expected counts are the 
heavy lines drawn over the blocks. The difference between the two shows the breadth of 
dissociation between a statistically homogeneous sample and observed measurements 
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IV. TIlE RESULTS 
The results of [his empirical analysis are introduced in three parts. The first part presents 
a summary of appropriations committee changes to defense procurement budget requests 
from 1989-1994. The next part explores those changes for statistical variations within 
then service and program element components. The final part presents a cross sectional 
analysis of authoriation and appropriations changes to the fiscal year budget for 1994 
The funding levels referred to and listed in the folioWlOg tables and graphs do not Include 
accounts designated for the Reserve forces 
A. RESUL1S OF TIlE MULTI-YEAR ANALYSIS 
The statistical analysis begins with a basic breakdown of procurement line-item 
changes relative to the total number of line-items listed in the P-l for each fiscal year 
The base number of annual line-item changes are listed m Figure 3. The number of 
changes varied between a low of 233 in FY 1989 to a high of 287 in FY 1993. Change 
percentages were calculated by dividmg base numbers of changes into the total number 
of hne-Items listed in the P-I for each respeetlve year and are presented in Table II. The 
percentage of line-items changed each year by the appropnations subcommittees varied 
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2. 
TABLE n PERCENT PROCUREMENT LINE-ITEMS CHANGED BY APPROPRIATIONS 
The next level of analysis describes line-item changes as a function of cuts or additions 
Figure 4 shows this breakdown. In each year more line-items were subtracted from than 
were added to. FY 1991 represented the widest disparity between changes adding 
(60 items) and changes cutting (226 items). Exploring further, the percentages additions 
and subtractions were determined and plotted with the total change percentages in 
Figure 5. As expected, the largest percentage of line-items cut occurred in FY 1991 when 
16.6% of procurement line-items were cut in funding by the appropriators. This action 
coincides with the largest dollar amount of cuts (roughly $16.5 billion). The largest 
percentage of line-items added occurred the following year when 8.8% of procurement 
line-items were increased in funding. However, the largest increase in the dollar additions 
to procurement line-items was in 1990 ($11.85 billion), and not 1992 ($5.68 billion). The 
pattern indicates that prior to 1991 there were a smaller number of large funding changes 
and since then the pattern has changed to a pattern of enacting a larger number of smaller 
dollar amount increases. The year with the largest percentage of procurement line-item 
changes was 1993 (22.9%). However, it is important to note that despite the apparent 
increase in the percentages of line-item changes, the actual number of line-items changed 
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Rather the total number of line-items listed in the pol has decreased from the numbers 
subnlltted at the beginning of the decade. The recent Increasc in the percent of line-item 
changes docs not appcar indicatIVe of any closer scrullny by the appropnatlOns 
subcomnllttees, but rather simply renects a decreasing procurement program 
The next level of analysis measured the number and pcrcentage of line-Item changes as 
a function of the dollar amount of change in the defense procurement budget (m billtons) 
This analysIs combmed the dollar amount of both addilion~ and subtractions enacted by 
the appropriations commIttees (absolute value of additions and subtractions were 
combmed as posiuve numbers, to measure the total dollar amount of change) Figure 6 
shows the dollar amount of change plotted against the total defense procuremcnt budget 
This chart indicates that the procurement budget has been on a steady decline (from $78 
billion in 1989 to $44 billion 11l 19(4) and since 1991 a commensurate decline 10 the total 
dollar amount of change 
The next step in the analysis was to identify the specific dollar changes enacted by the 
appropnators. Figure 7 breaks down and displays the specific change~ as addJlions and 
subtractions. The only year that Congress added more to procurement programs than il 
cut was FY 1990 (the same year as the Persw . .n Gulf War) It is noteworthy that despite 
a net mcrease of $4 4 bIllion in FY [990, the final appropriation was sId] $1 billion less 
than it had been in 19R9, There are two important points that can be drawn from the 
general analYSIS of the annual budget. The first IS that despite the rancorous and rhetorical 
protests of many congressIOnal crillcs, Congress changes relatively few of the hne-Itcms 
proposed in the procurement section preSidential budget request (on average about 20% 
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over the last six years) and the dollar value of those changes is small when compared to 
the total procurement budget 
The second point is that although Congress generally appears to defer budgeting to the 
defense department it can and will change the budget if it is dissatisfied with the 
Pentagon's strategic and structural policy rationale. FY J991 is unusual in just about 
every aspect measured in this study. The budget that year largely continued past policies 
even though historic events had reshaped the international balance of powers (and the 
American economy dipped into recession). The defense department's stance provoked 
sharp criticism on Capitol Hill that quickly moved beyond rhetoric. Paul Stockton 
observed that 
After attacking the testimony of Cheney and other defense officials in a series of 
defense policy hearings, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees began 
in the spring of 1990 to draft their own version of the defense budget. Differences 
soon emerged between the two committee "marks," with Nunn pushing for smaller 
cuts than did Congressman Les Aspin, chair of the House Armed Services 
Committee. Nevertheless, the defense authorization bills that emerged from the two 
committees reflected a different sense of program spending priorities (and lower 
overall spending levels) than those proposed by the president. (Stockton, 1993,240) 
The next part of the analysis focuses on the individual committee, service, and program 
element components of the appropriations changes to the presidential budget request. The 
first phase of the analysis studied the interactions of the House Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee (HDAS) and the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee (SDAS). 
Figure 8 shows the average line-item activity conducted by the lIDAS, SDAS, and by 
their fmal conference mark up. The mean for each committee was calculated by dividing 
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of the proposed changes (also specific to each committee) The figure shows the 
comparative magnitude of the average annual recommendation of each committee (per 
line·item) and the average change that results from the final conference mark up. The 
figure indicates thai more often the HDAS is closer to the average conference mark. 
While the measurement of the average change proposed by each appropriations 
committee is descriptive, additional statistical tools can be used to build a stronger basis 
of comparison. Correlation testing provides a more rigorous comparison between the 
actions of the two committees. Table III presents the computed correlation coefficients 
resulting from a comparison of the line·item dollar value changes within the 
appropriations committees and final conference. As described earlier, the higher the value 
of the coefficient, the closer the level of association between sample populations. The 
table indicates that the SDAS more often brings its change through the final conference 
(although as noted earlier, on average the HDAS is closer indicating that large changes 
proposed by the SDAS are not as readily accepted). The table also indicates an overall 
steady decline in the association between committee action and final conference mark 
The inference is that committee decisions on line-item changes matter less than they used 
to. The level of association in FY 1994 was particularly weak. 
TABLE m ANNUAL COMMITIEE TO CONFERENCE CHANGE CORRELA nON 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
HDAS 0.723 0.563 0.722 0.585 0.386 0.344 
SDAS 0.871 0.857 0.916 0.369 0.724 0.288 
SOURCE: DoD Financial Accounting Documents or FYs 198910 1994 
II 
The next level of analysis examined the results of appropriations committee line-item 
changes against individual service components. The raw number of annual line-item 
additions and subtractions for each service were plotted and are presented in Figure 9. The 
figure indicates that all services (excepting the Marine Corps) withstood a particularly 
large increase in the number of line-item cuts in 1991. Marine Corps procurement activity, 
which is relatively small in comparison to the other three services, tracks evenly over all 
the years studied. The specific dollar changes to service accounts are provided in 
Figure 10. Only the relatively good treatment of the Navy in FY 1990 (through additions) 
and mild treatment of the Army in FY 1991 (through limited cutting) stand out from the 
apparently even treatment of the services. Figures II through 18 provide separate service 
plots of percent and specific dollar changes for further clarity. Finally, the net dollar 
change in appropriations is provided by Figure 19. This figure shows that in general 
appropriators add to Army and Marine budgets while subtracting from Navy and Air 
Force budgets. However the net effect for all services is at most modest, not exceeding 
$3 billion in budgets averaging $20-$30 billion annually 
The final component level analysis examined appropriations committee activity against 
a breakdown of program elements_ The intent of this investigation is to find out if 
appropriators have an interest in any particular group of projects within the procurement 
account. ANOVA testing was used to explore differences in the means and variances in 
the Congressional treatment of program elements. The statistical results of the 
examination are provided in Table IV in the form of means tables differentiated by 
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Figure 19. Net Dollar Effect or Procurement Line-Item Changes by Service 
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TABLE IV MEANS DIFFERENTIATION OF PROCUREMENT LINE-ITEM CHANGES 
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITIEE 
ACFT WEAPS SHIPS VEHS AMMO OTHR 
1989 0.206 -0.110 0.035 0.031 -0.261 0.772 
1990 -0.109 -0.114 0.171 -0.127 0.082 -0.070 
1991 -0.203 -0.146 -0.134 -0.324 0.365 0.146 
1992 0.035 0.867 0.349 0.078 0.122 0.110 
1993 0.148 1.384 -0.1l0 -0.215 0.187 0.005 
1994 0.444 0.116 -0.093 -0.143 0.584 -0.180 
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE 
ACFT WEAPS SlOPS VEHS AMMO OTHR 
1989 0.089 -0.083 -0.130 0.573 -0.297 -0.168 
1990 -0.071 -0.130 -0.1l0 -0.232 -0.180 -0.122 
1991 -0.284 0.288 -0.267 -0.144 0.445 -0.223 
1992 -0.015 0.754 -0.098 -0.009 -0.065 -0.082 
1993 0.142 1.180 -0.280 -0.223 -0.149 -0.036 
1994 -0.098 0.064 -0.420 -0.121 -0.260 -0.310 
CONFERENCE 
ACFT WEAPS SlOPS VEHS AMMO OTHR 
1989 0.218 0.077 -0.095 0.636 -0.182 0.590 
199{) -0.052 -0.071 -0.095 -0.168 -0.052 -0.080 
1991 -0.327 0.192 -0.144 -0.341 0.624 0.130 
1992 0.052 0.774 0.079 -0.006 -0.002 0.015 
1993 0.211 L592 -0.127 1.129 -0.072 0.132 
1994 -0.003 0.113 -0.223 -0.083 0.565 -0.297 
SOURCE; DoD Financial Accounting Documents for FYs 1989 to 1994 
.. 
procurement program areas are significantly affect in a partIcular single year, there are no 
specific program categories that are generally affected. The mean tables also indicate that 
there is no specific pattern of change within the final conference mark. These results 
support the hypothesis that there arc no particular programs within the procurement 
account that are exceptionally Interesting to appropriators. Although not shown, p values 
calculated in conjunction with the means tables all indicated an insignificant level of 
association 
B. RESULTS OF THE SINGLE YF..AR ANALYSIS 
The broad trends found In the defense appropriations account are indIcative of how 
other accounts are treated and how the authorization committees act. The key findings in 
the study of the 1994 budget arc that the interrelationship between committees is 
generally more signifIcant than between chambers and that the total percent change to the 
budget request IS indicative of speCific change rates within the operations, procurement, 
and research accounts but not to changes within construction and housing accounts. The 
findmgs are suggestive that Congress generally micromanages the defense budget to fulfill 
its legitimate policy oversight responsibilities, even in areas where potentially significant 
direct public incentives could be a powerful lure for parochialism 
The initial assessment of Congressional micromanagement in the FY 1994 budget 
process paralleled the analyses of multi-year budgeteering_ The treatment of the defense 
budget request was broken down by committee, service, and program components to find 
distinct operatmg patterns_ Percent change and changes from expected were analyzed first 
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The study then examined dollar value changes by average, addition or cut, and net 
assessments with respect to the component breakdowns. Tables V and VI provide the 
percent of line-items changed and changes from expected by program and service. Figures 
20 and 21 provide this information graphically 
This data indicates that procurement programs are adjusted less than expected, 
research and personnel programs are adjusted about as much as expected, and that 
operations and construction programs are adjusted more than expected. No specific 
patterns of changes are measured through this examination but a pattern does seem to be 
indicated that will be investigated by more powerful statistical methods. Figures 22 
through 27 proVIde the dollar value breakdown of legislative line-item changes and show 
no clear patterns in Congressional interest. Again more cogent means Will be employed 
to verify the independence between committees and program or service components in the 
next phase of analysis 
Although the procurement account is changed the least among all accounts the 
relationship of the procurement account to the total number of hne-item changes and to 
the operations and research accounts is strong. A simple linear regression holding total 
percent change by committee as the independent variable against percent change in other 
committees yielded strong measures of correlation to operations, procurement, and 
research. Table VII shows the calculated coefficients of determination (R'), as noted 
before a test value above 0.9 indicates a strong (linear) relationship. The regression 
analysis was used instead of a correlation test because the unit measures of all the test 
variables are the same and because the regression analysis is more meaningful for small 
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TABLE V VARIATIONS IN CONGRESSIONAL ACTION BY PROGRAM 
HOUSE COMMITTEES 
PERS O&M PROCMENT RDT& E CONST HOUSING 
APP ASC APP ASC APP ASC APP ASC APP ASC APP 
% 26.8 23.5 397 10.8 \8.0 18.0 35.6 38.0 32.9 12.0 12.0 
18 84 106 128 214 180 271 137 119 9 9 
C 18 70 74 233 322 150 207 71 98 15 20 
4' 274 161 1059 973 582 491 224 242 66 66 
N 49 288 195 954 866 612 556 290 264 60 55 
SENATE COMMITTEES 
PERS O&M PROCMENT RDT&E CONST HOUSING 
APP Ase APP ASC APP ASC APP ASC API' ASC APP 
% 74.6 187 55.1 8.6 16.1 17.8 32.9 34.9 49.6 9.3 10.7 
50 67 147 102 191 136 251 126 179 7 8 
C 20 57 81 190 361 122 212 5& 110 12 2J 
17 291 120 1085 966 626 511 2J5 182 68 67 
N 47 301 186 997 826 640 530 303 251 63 
" 
FIN AL CONFERENCE 
PERS O&M PROCMENT RDT&E CONST HOUSING 
APP ASC APP ASC APP ASC APP ASC APP ASC APP 
% 61.2 31.6 54.3 12.1 22.0 26.2 44.0 49.9 57.3 16,0 17.3 
41 IIJ 145 144 261 200 335 180 207 12 13 
C 25 85 98 281 437 180 281 85 133 18 28 
26 245 122 1043 926 562 427 181 154 63 62 
N 42 273 169 906 750 582 481 276 228 57 47 
a es snow percent 0 o sC!>'ed C ange rom tot y program WI number 0 o servea 
line-item changes shown over number of expected line-item ehnnges by progranl. 
SOURer:: DoD Program BudgeLs (P-I,R-I,C-I) and Finnncial Accounting DocunlclIls for FY 1994. 
4. 
TABLE VI VARIATIONS IN CONGRESSIONAL ACTION BY SERVICE 
HOUSE COMMITTEES 
ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE MARINES DoD WIDE 
Ase APP Ase APP Ase APP ASC APP Ase APP 
% 25.9 33.0 15.J 21.5 16.6 14.6 29. 8 46.6 19.6 27.4 
178 224 11 9 165 132 180 9 22 101 149 
e m 186 153 210 156 2 16 29 41 66 88 
SlO 454 66 1 602 665 608 141 129 238 111 
N m 492 621 m 641 572 121 11 0 213 232 
SENATE COMMITTEES 
ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE MARINES DoD WIDE 
Ase APP Ase APP Ase APP Ase APP ASC APP 
% 18.5 33.8 9.1 24.4 15.4 34.4 8.1 19.9 29.8 34.7 
121 229 16 181 123 211 13 30 10 1 III 
e 110 208 I2S 
'" 
121 241 24 46 54 98 
56 1 449 104 " 0 614 SI1 131 12 1 238 209 
N m 410 6" 
'" 
610 541 126 105 "5 222 
FINAL CONFERENCE 
ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE MARINES DoD WIDE 
Ase APP As e APP Ase APP Ase APP Ase APP 
% 28.1 44.4 15.8 29.2 22.8 36.0 8.0 19.9 4 1.6 51.9 
193 301 123 224 182 284 12 30 141 166 
e 163 252 184 
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Figure 20. Percent or FY 94 Budget Request Line-Items Changed (by PI"ogram) 
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Figure 22. Net Dollar Effect or Changes to FY 94 Budget Reque~t (by Program) 
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Figure 23. Total Changes by Additions (0 FY 94 Budget Request (by Program) 
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Figul'e 25. Net Dollar Errect of Changes to FY 94 Budget Request (by Service) 
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Figun' 26. Total Changes by Additions to FY 94 Budget Request (by Sel"Vice) 
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Figore 27. Total Changes by Recessions to FY 94 Budget Request (by Service) 
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TABLE VII REGRESSION ASSOCIATION OF PERCENT CHANGE 
ASSOCIATION OF PERCENT CHANGE BY PROGRAM TO TOTAL CHANGE 
I O&M I PRO I RDTE I CON I HSG 
COEFF OF DETERMINATION I .9085 I .9195 I .9426 J .5399 I 3713 
ASSOCIATION OF PERCENT CHANGE BY SERVICE TO TOTAL CHANGE 
I ARMY I NAVY I AIRF I MARN I DoD 
COEFF OF DETERMINATION I .9674 I .9719 I .9022 I .7872 I .6349 
SOURCE, DoD Program Budgets (P-I,R-I,C-l) and Fmancial Accounting Documents for FY 1994. 
test samples. A similar test along service lines indicated that there is also a strong 
relationship between the various committee treatments of changes to service budgets but 
nol to defense-wide requests. The actual spending patterns did not show strong patterns 
of association in either program or service shares as shown by Table VIII and IX. 
When considering change patterns it is clear from the contingency tables that 
procurement is adjusted less often than other accounts. Similarly it is ex;plicit that 
operations and construction accounts are adjusted more frequently than other accounts. 
The significant difference belween the operations account and others is that it is not 
presented in a programmed format when the budget goes to Congress, rather it is 
submitted as a collection of broad categories with virtually no elemental breakdown 
Congress generates line-items when it breaks the account down into a more practical 
format. There is no prevailing pattern among the committees of adding or cutting the 
operations budget through those changes (FY 1994 Authorizations reduced the O&M 
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TABLE VlU CORRELATION ASSOCIATION OF LINE-ITEM CHANGES 
SOURCE: 000 Financial Accounting Document for FY 1994 
TABLE IX REGESSION ASSOCIATION OF DOLLAR VALUE CHANGE 
PROGRAM DIFFERENTIATION 
ASSOCIATION OF CO.M:MITI'EE CHANGES TO FINAL CONFERENCE CHANGE 
HASC IIDAS SASC SDAS 
I"'r AVG of So CHANGES 410 442 129 994 
perS CHANGE BY ADDS 473 .996 964 341 
perS CHANGE BY CUTS 
.150 584 605 126 
SERVICE DIFFERENTIATION 
ASSOCIATION OF COMMTITEE CHANGES TO FINAL CONFERENCE CHANGE 
HASC IIDAS 
1"'1" AVG of So CHANGES 839 952 
perS CHANGE BY ADDS 656 978 
pcr S CHANGE BY CU1S 029 860 






budget, FY 1994 Appropriations increased it). The military construction budget potentially 
has the greatest parochial gain because the changes there immediately and directly effect 
constituent interests. In fact there appears to be a great deal of activity above expected 
in the construction accounts. However, this year is anomalous within that account because 
the services submitted budgets not accounting for BRAC closures and so required 
Congress to act to rescind funds for projects requested at bases that are soon to be closed 
This explains some of the additional line-items and negative adjustments to this account 
in FY 94 (though the bulk of the recessions came from cutting support for overseas 
bases). The area of base closure is one where Congress has shown that it knows its own 
liabilities and can act above parochial interests. Christopher Derring summarized the 
process whereby the House and Senate ... 
successfully joined forces to create base-closing legislation (in 1988) ... {the 
independent commission appointed by the secretary of defense) recommended the 
closure of 86 bases and partial closure of five others. The recommendation was 
endorsed by the defense secretary and by all but four members of the House 
committee. A resolution to reject the package, that is, to keep the bases open, was 
then defeated on the House floor. While the 1988 law provided for only a single 
round of base closings, the 1991 defense authorization bill provided for a slightly 
revised commission process of three more rounds of cuts-in 1991, 1993, and 1995. 
The base-closing procedure is essentially a means for the committees and for 
Congress to make a decision in the public's interest that would not otherwise be 
forthcoming. Members affected by the cuts are able to engage in the necessary 
symbolic opposition but the packages are of sufficient size to sustain protest votes 
against them. Although the initiative has returned to the Pentagon, since the defense 
secretary promulgates the initial list, the commission shields members by its 
endorsement, allows for member input, and the all-or-nothing procedure prevents 
serial consideratton of each of the proposed closings. (Derring, 1993, 179-180) 
This is a clear instance where, although the services provided Congress the opportunity 
to easily legislate parochial interests, both the House and Senate chose to observe the 
higher goal of fiscal responsibility The statutory nature of the construction account 
6' 
requires that each project (program element and sub-element) must be specifically 
authorized and appropriated to execute funding. Therefore each project must specifically 
be rescinded to stop funding, in an aggregated context the process would be counted 
against Congress as micro management of defense department budgeting. 
Among the four important defense budgeting committees, it is clear that each 
committee acts independently of one another. A correlation of committee action based on 
line-item dollar value changes over the whole budget indicated only a weak correlation 
between the Authorization comminees and a separate weak correlation between the 
Appropriations committees and conference mark up. The specific correlation coefficients 
are shown in Table VIII. A correlation study was used in lieu of regression analysis 
because of the large sample size and significant difference in the magnitude of dollar 
value changes throughout the budget (unit valuation is irrelevant to correlation studies). 
There is also only a weak correlation between the Authorization bill and Appropriations 
bill, The Appropriation's Defense Subcommittees generally do look at line-items changed 
by the Armed Services Committees and stay within authorized limits of those line-items 
In FY 94, appropriations exceeded authorizations in 16% of all line-items, this included 
both exceeding dollar changes to authorization changes and increasing funding to 
line-items not considered by the Armed Services Committee's Final Bill. The 
Appropriations Subcommittee evaluates and changes a significant number of additional 
line-items not even considered during authorization's mark ups . 
• 2 
V. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this thesis was to describe the patterns of Congressional Committee 
line-item changes on the defense budget. The study conducted included empirical analyses 
of appropriations committee changes to defense procurement budget requests from 
FY 1989-1994 and a cross sectional analysis of authorization and appropriations changes 
to the FY 1994 budget. The principle findings within the examination of annual 
procurement appropriations indicate that legislative line·item micromanagement is both 
enduring and consistent. Congress regularly changes from 20% to 23% of the line·items 
submitted each year in the president's budget request. When measured in billions of 
dollars the change has not exceeded 27% of the total, even when there was a high degree 
of legislative dissatisfaction with the budget proposal. An evaluation of the net financial 
effect on the Congressional changes would conclude that the impact is slight in 
comparison with overall procurement spending; the net dollar change in funding for all 
the years studied is shown in Figure 28. Reductions of$I.71 billion in FY 1992, $1.96 
billion in FY 1993, and $1.8 billion dollars in $1994 are relatively small when compared 
to procurement budgets of$62 billion, $54.8 billion and $44.3 billion dollars for each of 
those respective years Of course, for particular programs, such funding changes can have 
a decisive impact. 
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Figure 18. Net Dollar Effect of Annual Change, to DoD Budget Request ( Pro~urement) 
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The examination of specific components suggested that there are no favorite sons 
among the program elements within the procurement account (or any other account) and 
that the services receive roughly equal treatment. Although the House Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee stays closer to the average conference mark up the Senate 
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee brings its mark through more often. 
The findings of the cross sectional analysis support the findings that Congress is 
impartial in its treatment of budget programs or services. In general, the percent total 
number of line-item changes is proportionally related to the percent change in the budget's 
operations, procurement, and research accounts. Construction and housing accounts are 
treated separately, physically and statistically. Within all of these accounts, Congress 
anticipates a certain level of detail in the budget request. The procurement and research 
accounts are suitably partitioned and very few line-items are added to either of these 
sections, the operations account is not so Congress partitions that section itself. When it 
does so the new line-items it inserts are usually cuts. Congresses treatment of the reserve 
and guard is similar. Since the end of the Cold war, the defense department has generally 
sought to reduce reserve and guard funding. Congress, probably reacting along both policy 
and parochial lines, has been protecting reserve and guard budgets. When it restores 
funding to these two programs, it reduces funding elsewhere. The resulting 
micromanagement is counter-productive to the specific program cut in balance but 
essentially inconsequential to the makeup of the total defense budget. 
Within Congress, there is very little cohesion between the various defense oversight 
committees other than the fact that appropriators do tend to stay within the limits set by 
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the authorization bill. Legislators agree stallstically more often by chamber (HASC to 
HDAS & SAse to SDAS) than by committee but only marginally so. The levels of 
association along specific dollar value changes are very weak Only as a percent of total 
line-item changes along program and servIce sections is there any consistent pattern 
between the various defense oversight committees. Overall, within that pattern, 
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